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Abstract
In many industrial applications of big data, the Jaccard Similarity Computation has been
widely used to measure the distance between two profiles or sets respectively owned by two
users. Yet, one semi-honest user with unpredictable knowledge may also deduce the private or
sensitive information (e.g., the existence of a single element in the original sets) of the other
user via the shared similarity.
In this paper, we aim at solving the privacy issues in Jaccard similarity computation with
strict differential privacy guarantees. To achieve this, we first define the Conditional -DPSO,
a relaxed differential privacy definition regarding set operations, and prove that the MinHash-
based Jaccard Similarity Computation (MH-JSC) satisfies this definition. Then for achieving strict
differential privacy in MH-JSC, we propose the PrivMin algorithm, which consists of two private
operations: 1) the Private MinHash Value Generation that works by introducing the Exponential
noise to the generation of MinHash signature. 2) the Randomized MinHashing Steps Selection
that works by adopting Randomized Response technique to privately select several steps within
the MinHashing phase that are deployed with the Exponential mechanism. Experiments on real
datasets demonstrate that the proposed PrivMin algorithm can successfully retain the utility of
the computed similarity while preserving privacy.
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1 Introduction
With the widespread of real-world big data applications such as recommendation systems and social
network, similarity computation has become one essential process as it measures the distances
between different user profiles. Utilizing the similarity between users or items, the service providers
can further carry out data analytic tasks such as clustering, classification or recommendation.
Among the varieties of similarity measures, Jaccard Similarity is a popular one that has been
widely used to compare the similarity of two given sets. More specifically, for two sets SA and SB,
their Jaccard similarity is defined as the ratio between the size of their intersection and the size of
their union.
However, because of the adoption of Jaccard similarity in real-world applications, one increasing
concern is the potential privacy leakage. Let us consider one example scenario as described below.
Example 1 In cloud services, the similarity computation may be available for users who want to
know the “semantic distance” between their data.
Assume a cloud platform which provides such a service of Jaccard similarity computation
between two sets SA and SB privately owned by users UA and UB, respectively. Each set
contains a fixed number of textual tags that reflect the user’s reading preferences, such as
SA = {History, Politics, Science, Law, Travel} and SB = {History, Science, Travel,
Cookbooks, Fiction}. The cloud service may estimate the Jaccard similarity as |SA∩SB ||SA∪SB | =
0.429, and make it available for users UA and UB.
Remarkably, based on the above shared similarity and the prior knowledge that the value of
|SA ∪SB| should fall into the range of 5 to 10, UB can easily work out the values of |SA ∩SB|
and |SA ∪ SB|, which are 3 and 7 respectively. Moreover, if UB further knows in advance
that UA does not like the book genres such as cookbooks and fiction, he would basically
make sure that his three tags in common with UA are {History, Science, Travel}. In
addition, when we take into account the fact that there are two collusive users UB and UC
who are interested in UA’s private information, it would not take these collusive users much
background knowledge to achieve their purpose. UB would also achieve the attack goal easily
through the similarity with UA via different carefully constructed sets.
As shown in the above example, users with background knowledge can induce other users’
private information with high probability by observing their shared similarity. Hence, how to
preserve the privacy in the Jaccard similarity computation is an emerging issue that needs to be
addressed.
In the past decade, Differential Privacy has emerged as a solid privacy model with a provable
privacy guarantee, regardless of the adversary’s background knowledge. Recently, some researches
have focused on the privacy issue in similarity computation by incorporating the differential privacy
mechanism. Alaggan et al. [1] proposed several secure protocols to compute differentially private
values of Scalar Product and Cosine similarity. Their follow-up paper [2] proposed a differentially
private method for randomizing the intermediate outputs instead of adding noise to the final Cosine
similarity outputs. Wong et al. [22] first proposed a secure protocol for a specific Jaccard similarity
computation for the binary data. However, those tailored Jaccard similarity computations cannot
be generalized to other situations. To the best of our knowledge, there is limited researches that have
addressed the privacy concerns in the general Jaccard similarity computation while maintaining the
acceptable utility and efficiency.
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As the advances in Hashing techniques, such as the MinHash and SimHash, the current research
barriers can be tackled in a natural way. The MinHash technique [6] was proposed to efficiently
approximate the value of Jaccard similarity instead of the precise one, so it can significantly improve
the computation efficiency when a large collection of data involved [7, 8]. For convenience, we refer
to this processing workflow as MinHash-based Jaccard Similarity Computation (MH-JSC).
In this paper, we will present an intuition that the MH-JSC is internally connected with a relaxed
differential privacy, because its expected error θ can be regarded as noise. This intuition opens
the opportunity to design a differentially private Jaccard similarity computation algorithm, which
protects the certainty of presence/absence of any element in the original profile. However, there are
still two main challenges when designing the differentially private Jaccard similarity computation
algorithm:
• The first challenge is how to measure the randomness within the MH-JSC for further analyzing
its relationship with the differential privacy.
• The second challenge lies on how to leverage the minimum hash value computation process
within the MinHashing phase for achieving strict differential privacy in MH-JSC while main-
taining an acceptable utility.
For the first challenge, we investigate the relationship between the MH-JSC and the differential
privacy via a relaxed differential privacy definition, Conditional -DPSO. Based on this, we intend
to design a differentially private Jaccard similarity computation algorithm via the Exponential
mechanism, which leverages the minimum hash value computation process within the MinHashing
phase. As the introduced Exponential noise will distort the utility in a large extent, the second
challenge can be solved by introducing the Randomized Response technique to privately select some
MinHashing steps for adopting the Exponential mechanism.
Based on these, we finally present the PrivMin algorithm to achieve the differentially private
Jaccard similarity computation, and the contributions in this paper can be summarized as follows:
• Firstly, through the relaxed differential privacy, Conditional -DPSO, we investigate the ran-
domness within the MH-JSC and provide relevant privacy analysis in detail.
• Secondly, we design a practical differential private Jaccard similarity computation algorithm,
PrivMin, which maintains an acceptable utility. Theoretical analysis and extensive experi-
ments are provided to verify the improved performance.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. We present the preliminaries and related works in
Section 2, and provide the problem statement in Section 3. In Section 4, we define the Conditional -
DPSO to depict a relax situation when considering differential privacy for set operations, followed
by theoretical privacy analysis of the MH-JSC under this definition. In Section 5, we describe
the PrivMin algorithm for achieving the differentially private MinHash-based Jaccard similarity
computation. The theoretical privacy analysis and utility analysis of the algorithm are proposed
in Section 6. Section 7 presents experimental results, and conclusions are given in Section 8.
2 Preliminaries and Related Works
This section reviews four fundamental concepts: Jaccard Similarity, MinHash, Differential Privacy
and Randomized Response, and then briefly surveys the related works in Differentially Private
Similarity Computation.
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Table 1 lists the relevant notations used in this paper.
Table 1: Notations
Symbol Description
MH-JSC abbreviation of MinHash-based Jaccard similarity computation
S user’s private profile S = {s1, s2, ..., sN}
J(SA, SB) original Jaccard similarity of SA and SB
σ a conventional notation to represent the value of J(SA, SB)
Jmh(SA, SB) original MinHash-based Jaccard similarity of SA and SB
θ expected error in Jmh(SA, SB) compared with J(SA, SB)
J˜mh(SA, SB) perturbed MinHash-based Jaccard similarity of SA and SB
∆Jmh the sensitivity of MH-JSC
K number of hash functions
hk(S) hash values set of profile S when given a hash function hk(·)
min{hk(S)} the minimum hash value in hk(S)
h(K)(S) original MinHash signature vector
h˜(K)(S) perturbed MinHash signature vector−→
V original flip vector
Pr bit flipping probability in original flip vector generation−→
V ′ perturbed flip vector
Pt bit flipping probability in perturbed flip vector generation
 overall privacy budget
2.1 Preliminaries
Definition 1 (Jaccard Similarity). Assume SA and SB are two sets owned by user A and user B
respectively. Their Jaccard similarity is defined as
J(SA, SB) =
|SA ∩ SB|
|SA ∪ SB| . (1)
2.1.1 MinHash
The MinHash was initially proposed in [6, 7] for quickly estimating the similarity between two
textual documents which have been respectively expressed as sets SA and SB. The basic intuition for
the MinHash technique is the replacement of the original sets SA and SB by their relevant MinHash
Signatures h(K)(SA) and h(K)(SB) when computing the Jaccard similarity. For the convenience of
the following descriptions, we refer to the above similarity estimating process as MinHash-based
Jaccard Similarity Computation (MH-JSC).
In practice, the MH-JSC between textual documents usually involves three main phases: the
Shingling phase to formulate the textual documents into set representations, the MinHashing phase
to generate the relevant MinHash signatures, followed by the approximate computation phase.
Specifically, in the Shingling phase, the document is firstly segmented intoN parts (shingles) and
represented as the set S = {s1, s2, ..., sN}; in the process of the MinHashing phase, K hash functions
hk with k ∈ [1,K] are orderly applied to S and generate hk(S) = {hk(s1), hk(s2), ..., hk(sN )}, and
then the minimum hash value min{hk(S)} is selected as the k-th element of the MinHash Signature
h(K)(S), as shown in Fig 1.
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b) Then select the minimum hash value 
in ℎ𝑘 𝑆 = ℎ𝑘 𝑠1 , … , ℎ𝑘 𝑠𝑁 . 
−−−−→ 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ℎ1 𝑆
−−−−→ …
−−−−→ 𝑚𝑖𝑛 ℎ𝐾 𝑆
ℎ 𝐾 𝑆
a) In each step 𝑘, first calculate the hash values of
𝑆 = 𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑁 under the given hash function ℎ𝑘 ⋅ . 
step 1: { ℎ1 𝑠1 ℎ1 𝑠2 … ℎ1 𝑠𝑁 }
… { … … … … }
step K: { ℎ𝐾 𝑠1 ℎ𝐾 𝑠2 … ℎ𝐾 𝑠𝑁 }
Figure 1: MinHashing Phase
Given the MinHash signatures h(K)(SA) and h(K)(SB) for two textual documents SA and SB,
an unbiased estimate of the Jaccard similarity between SA and SB is formulated as
Jmh(SA, SB) =
|h(K)(SA) ∩ h(K)(SB)|
K
, (2)
with an expected error θ = O( 1√
K
).
For the convenience of description, if we adopt the notation σ to represent the value of J(SA, SB),
the probability for Jmh(SA, SB) to fall into the range [σ−θ, σ+θ] can be calculated via the following
equation [6]:
p(K,σ, θ) =
∑
K(σ−θ)≤t≤K(σ+θ)
(
K
t
)
(σ)t(1− σ)K−t. (3)
2.1.2 Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is based on the principle that the output of a computation should not allow
inference about any element’s presence or absence from the computation’s input. Hence in the
context of Jaccard similarity computation, the present or absent status of the elements within
input data is expected to be protected under the rigorous differential privacy definition which is
described below.
Definition 2 (-Differential Privacy [11]). A randomized algorithmM gives -differential privacy if
for all neighbour sets S and S′ differing on at most one element, and all O ⊆ Range(M), we have
Pr[M(S) ∈ O] ≤ e · Pr[M(S′) ∈ O].
Algorithm M is associated with the sensitivity, which measures the maximum change on the
result of query function f when one element from the set S changes [10].
Definition 3 (Sensitivity). For any function f : S → Rd, and for all S, S′ differing in at most one
element, the sensitivity of f is 4f = max
S,S′
‖f(S)− f(S′)‖1.
To satisfy the definition of differential privacy, two basic mechanisms are usually utilized: the
Laplace mechanism and the Exponential mechanism. And the Laplace mechanism is suitable for
numeric output and relies on the strategy of adding the Laplacian noise Laplace(·) to the query
result [12]. It is formally defined as the following:
Definition 4 (Laplace Mechanism). Given a function f : S → Rd, the mechanism,
M(S) = f(S) + (Y1, ..., Yd),
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where Yi are i.i.d random variables drawn from Laplace(
4f
 ).
The Exponential mechanism focuses on queries with non-numeric output [17]. It pairs with an
application dependent Score Function q(S, ψ), which represents how good an output scheme ψ is
for query q. The Exponential mechanism is formally defined as
Definition 5 (Exponential Mechanism). An Exponential mechanism M is -differential privacy if
M(S) = {return ψ with the probability ∝ exp( q(S,ψ)24q )}.
To guarantee the overall privacy when it comes to a sequence of differentially private operations,
we have the following composition properties [16].
Theorem 1 (Sequential Composition). Given n independent randomized algorithms A1,A2, ...,An
where Ai(1 ≤ i ≤ n) satisfies i-differential privacy, a sequence of Ai over the dataset S satisfies
-differential privacy, where  =
∑n
1 (i).
Theorem 2 (Parallel Composition). Given n independent randomized algorithms A1,A2, ...,An
where Ai(1 ≤ i ≤ n) satisfies i-differential privacy, a sequence of Ai over a set of disjoint datasets
Si satisfies max(i)-differential privacy.
2.1.3 Randomized Response
Randomized Response is a commonly used survey technique in statistics [20]. When a respondent
is asked a sensitive question for which the answer can be either yes or no, he has the opportunity
to answer the question with plausible deniability. To do so, the respondent flips a biased coin
before answering the question. If the coin turns head with a probability p, he gives his true answer;
otherwise, he reports the opposite of the true answer. It has pointed out that Randomized Response
can be regarded as a specific randomized algorithm that satisfies the -differential privacy, if the
coin flipping probability p of the algorithm has the following relationship with the privacy budget
 [13, 4]:
p =
e
1 + e
. (4)
2.2 Related Works
2.2.1 Differentially Private Similarity Computation
For the applications such as recommender system [3, 22], several works have been proposed to
address the potential privacy issues in two-party profiles computation [1, 5], in user profiles col-
lection [19, 18] and in the profile related data releasing [2, 23, 24] by the third party.
Most of these works were focused on the distributed environments in which the involved users
are semi-honest while the third party (if it existed) is assumed as semi-trusted or even untrusted.
Therefore, users profile must be perturbed or encrypted before being sent to other users or the third
party for further processing such as similarity computation, an essential component in collaborative
filtering. In addition, sometimes the released similarity also needs to be perturbed.
For achieving the differentially private similarity computation by output perturbation, the line
of research was pioneered by Alaggan et al. [1], who introduced the Laplace mechanism into the
Scalar Product and Cosine similarity computation. In particular, their proposed secure protocols
were partially based on Homomorphic Encryption and worked by adding the Laplacian noise to the
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similarity. Following a similar strategy, Wong et al. [22] presented a secure protocol for a specific
Jaccard similarity computation of binary data.
For profile perturbation, Alaggan et al. [2] considered the scenario of profile release and proposed
the BLIP mechanism in which the Bloom filter of user profile would be distorted by Randomized
Response before being released to the public. The Scalar Product and Cosine similarity were consid-
ered in this work. Barthe et al. [3] proposed a two-party protocol for computing Hamming distance
between bit-vectors via Homomorphic Encryption and the Laplace mechanism. Boutet et al. [5]
designed an obfuscation protocol and a randomized dissemination protocol for two-party Jaccard
similarity computation. Besides, existing works focused also on the perturbation of user profiles for
dataset release and for multi-level privacy needs instead of specific similarity computation needs.
Zhu et al. [23, 24] considered the privacy issues in releasing and sharing of tagging datasets in
tagging recommender systems and presented the private tagging release algorithm PriTop based
on the topic generation model, on the Laplace mechanism and on the Exponential mechanism.
Shen et al. [19, 18] aimed to achieve multi-level privacy control in user profile perturbation and
proposed the DP-MultiUPP and EpicRec frameworks based on the Laplace mechanism and opti-
mization techniques.
Table 2 gives the comparison among the existing works for differentially private similarity
computation. The main details of our proposed PrivMin algorithm are also listed in the table, and
the differences between our work and the existing works will be discussed in the next section.
Table 2: Differentially Private Similarity Computation Comparison
Related Work Third Party Setting Similarity Type Perturbation Approach Involved Method
Alaggan et al. [1]
None or
Semi-trusted
Scalar Product,
Cosine Similarity
Output Perturbation
Homomorphic Encryption,
Laplace Mechanism
Wong et al. [22] Semi-trusted Jaccard Similarity Output Perturbation
Homomorphic Encryption,
Laplace Mechanism
Barthe et al. [3] None Hamming Distance Profile Perturbation
Homomorphic Encryption,
Laplace Mechanism
Alaggan et al. [2] None
Scalar Product,
Cosine Similarity
Profile Perturbation
Bloom Filter,
Randomized Response
Boutet et al. [5] None Jaccard Similarity Profile Perturbation
Compact profile construction,
Randomized Response
PrivMin Trusted Jaccard Similarity Profile Perturbation
MinHash Signature,
Exponential Mechanism,
Randomized Response
2.2.2 Discussion
Based on the above analysis, the differences between our work and the existing works can be
concluded in three aspects:
• Firstly, compared to the distributed setting of the existing works, our work is focused on
the centralized setting. Moreover, this work mainly assumes that the third party is trusted
while the existing works generally assumed a semi-trusted third party or no third party at
all. The main reason of such assumptions in our work is that in many real-world applications
of recommendation and plagiarism detection, the service providers always have access to
users profiles and then use their storage capacity and computing ability to provide users with
varieties of services. Even so, the proposed PrivMin algorithm can also be extended for the
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untrusted third party scenario, since it has the ability to release perturbed users profiles
before entering the similarity computation phase.
• Secondly, for the research of differentially private Jaccard similarity computation, the existing
work such as [22] was partially focused on applying the Laplace mechanism to the original
Jaccard similarity computation equation, which cannot maintain a high utility of the released
similarity. Besides, due to its assumption of binary input data, the current work failed to
meet the privacy needs in the application scenario as shown in Example 1. Moreover, few
attention has been devoted to the relationship between MinHash-based Jaccard similarity
computation and differential privacy, which is the basic rationale and main contribution of
our work.
• Thirdly, in order to adopt the Randomized Response technique, the existing works (e.g., [2, 5])
were focused on directly distorting user profiles which are represented as binary expressions.
However, if relying on some specific value computation process such as MinHashing, we find
that the combination of Randomized Response technique with Exponential mechanism could
provide the possibility to design a differentially private algorithm with acceptable utility. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to incorporate the Exponential mecha-
nism with the Randomized Response in the context of differentially private Jaccard similarity
computation.
2.3 Summary
For differentially private similarity computation, the existing works have established two pertur-
bation strategies to address relevant issues, and provided referential ideas and solutions for differ-
entially private algorithm design. However, currently there has been limited research attention in
the MinHash-based Jaccard Similarity Computation (MH-JSC) to design the differentially private
Jaccard similarity computation algorithm. Based on the observation that the internal randomness
within MH-JSC is related with a relaxed differential privacy, this paper aims to address the following
specific research issues:
• How to measure the randomness within MH-JSC?
• How to achieve strict differential privacy in MH-JSC?
3 Problem Statement
This section first introduces the system and threat model considered in this work, and then clearly
presents the differentially private Jaccard similarity computation problem, along with its challenges.
3.1 System and Threat Model
Since in many real-life scenarios users are expected to provide their true data to the cloud platform
in order to access add-on services such as accurate recommendation, we assume that the cloud
platform will not collude with any user and is trusted. Meanwhile, the platform users are supposed
to be semi-honest, namely they are willing to provide their own data to the cloud but also curious
about other users’ sensitive information.
Fig. 2 shows the system and treat model.
7
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Semi-honest 
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Figure 2: System and Threat Model
3.2 Problem Definition
In this work, we are addressing the problem of differentially private Jaccard similarity computation,
which can be described as follows.
Assume two users UA and UB, each of them respectively maintains the profile SA and SB on the
trusted cloud platform. Given their profiles SA and SB and the privacy budget , the cloud platform
is expected to calculate the Jaccard similarity J(SA, SB) and shares a perturbed version with these
two users. On one hand, the overall similarity computation mechanism should satisfy -differential
privacy such that no semi-honest users can infer the present or absent status of the elements in other
user profiles based on the shared similarity. On the other hand, the shared perturbed similarity
should also maintain acceptable utility for further data analysis or value-adding services.
3.3 Research Issues and Challenges
In this paper, we aim to solve the differentially private Jaccard similarity computation problem
by leveraging the MinHash and MH-JSC. However, directly introducing differential privacy into the
MH-JSC brings up two major challenges.
How to measure the randomness within MH-JSC? As introduced in Section 2, the MinHash-
based Jaccard Similarity Computation can estimate the Jaccard Similarity with an expected
error θ. It seems that this error can be regarded as a kind of internal randomized noise, which
makes it possible for MH-JSC to achieve differential privacy. If the above hypothesis is proved
right, it is not necessary to add any extra external noise to MH-JSC since the internal noise
could be enough.
In Section 4, we will define -DPSO and conditional -DPSO, to analyze the relationship
between the randomness within the MH-JSC and differential privacy.
How to achieve strict differential privacy in MH-JSC? Based on the randomness analysis in
Section 4, we will show that MH-JSC only satisfies a relaxation of strict differential privacy, the
conditional -DPSO. For achieving strict differential privacy, although the Laplace mechanism
can be applied to perturbed the original MinHash-based Jaccard similarity, the final utility of
similarity will be distorted in a large extent. In Section 5 we will adopt the Profile Perturbation
approach and propose two private operations to constitute the PrivMin algorithm, along with
the relevant privacy analysis in Section 6. This algorithm also exploits the minimum hash
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value computation process within the MinHashing phase. In the meanwhile, the Exponential
mechanism and Randomized Response will be carefully adopted for maintaining an acceptable
utility.
4 Randomness Analysis within MH-JSC
In this section, in order to study the relationship between the internal randomness within the
MH-JSC and the differential privacy, we first provide a relaxed definition of differential privacy
(-DPSO) for set operations, and then prove that the MH-JSC satisfies the -DPSO.
4.1 Differentially Private Set Operations
In the definition of differential privacy 2 the neighbouring datasets are S and S′ which differ in
one element, while the algorithm M is randomized with its non-deterministic output M(S) which
belongs to Range(M). In what follows, we relax this definition for set operations.
For a data set pair {SA, SB} that consists of two data sets SA and SB, its neighboring data set
pair {SA, SB}′ is defined as either {S′A, SB} or {SA, S′B}, where SA differs in one element with S′A,
and SB differs in one element with S
′
B. The randomized algorithm M¨ is a set operation process with
a nondeterministic output in the range Range(M¨). Based on the above setting, the Differentially
Private Set Operations (-DPSO) is formally defined as
Definition 6 (-DPSO). A randomized set operation algorithm M¨ gives -differential privacy if for
all neighbouring data set pairs {SA, SB} and {SA, SB}′ differing on at most one element, and all
O ⊆ Range(M¨), we have
Pr[M¨({SA, SB}) ∈ O] ≤ e · Pr[M¨({SA, SB}′) ∈ O].
Next, for a randomized set operation algorithm M¨, we observe that although all its possible
outputs belong to O, there maybe exist a narrower outputs set Oσ that includes the most possible
outputs of the algorithm. For example, in the MH-JSC, the probability for its output Jmh(SA, SB)
to be in the range [σ − θ, σ + θ] could be relatively high if given appropriate parameters, as shown
in Eq. 3. Therefore, as a condition, if we only focus on the most possible outputs Oσ instead of all
possible outputs O of a randomized set operation algorithm M¨, the Conditional -DPSO can be
further defined as
Definition 7 (Conditional -DPSO). A randomized set operation algorithm M¨ gives conditional
-differential privacy if for all neighbouring data set pairs {SA, SB} and {SA, SB}′ differing on at
most one element, and for the most possible outputs Oσ ⊆ Range(M¨),
Pr[M¨({SA, SB}) ∈ Oσ] ≤ e · Pr[M¨({SA, SB}′) ∈ Oσ].
4.2 Privacy Analysis of MH-JSC
Here, we will show that the MH-JSC satisfies the conditional -DPSO:
Theorem 3. The MH-JSC satisfies the conditional -DPSO.
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Proof. Assume that σ and σ′ are the value of J(SA, SB) and J(SA, SB)′, respectively, and
all sets SA, S
′
A, SB and S
′
B have the same size, that is, |SA|= |S′A|= |SB|= |S′B|= n, according to
equation 1, we have
J(SA, SB) =
|SA ∩ SB|
|SA ∪ SB|
= σ
and
J(S′A, SB) =
|S′A ∩ SB|
|S′A ∪ SB|
= σ′
or
J(SA, S
′
B) =
|SA ∩ S′B|
|SA ∪ S′B|
= σ′ .
Then we can have |σ − σ′|≤ 1n , because the maximum change of the numerator between σ and
σ′ is 1 and the minimum of the denominator between σ and σ′ is n.
According to Eq. (3) and above conclusion, we have
Pr[Jmh(SA, SB) ∈ Oσ]
Pr[Jmh(SA, SB
′) ∈ Oσ] =
Pr[Jmh(SA, SB) ∈ [σ − θ, σ + θ]
Pr[Jmh(SA, SB
′) ∈ [σ − θ, σ + θ]]
≤ Pr[Jmh(SA, SB) ∈ [σ − θ, σ + θ]
Pr[Jmh(SA, SB
′) ∈ [σ′ − (θ + 1n), σ′ + (θ + 1n)]
=
p(K,σ, θ)
p(K,σ′, θ + 1n)
=
∑
K(σ−θ)≤t≤K(σ+θ)
(
K
t
)
(σ)t(1− σ)K−t∑
K(σ′−θ− 1
n
)≤t′≤K(σ′+θ+ 1
n
)
(
K
t′
)
(σ′)t′(1− σ′)K−t′
= e.
Based on above formula derivations, we can conclude that if we use the Oσ instead of O to
represent the most possible outputs of M¨, the computation process of MinHash-based Jaccard
Similarity satisfies the conditional -DPSO with  = ln( p(K,σ,θ)
p(K,σ′,θ+ 1
n
)
).
Since the above privacy property is based on the observation of a particular subset of the output
space of MH-JSC, the MH-JSC still cannot achieve the strict differential privacy in which the privacy
property should be maintained across all the output space. That is to say, the randomness within
the MH-JSC can only lead to a limited indistinguishability of its outputs, and external noise is still
required for MH-JSC to achieve the -differential privacy, as shown in Section 5.
5 Private Jaccard Similarity Computation
In this section, we propose a Private MinHash-based Jaccard Similarity Computation (PrivMin)
algorithm to achieve the strict differential privacy in MH-JSC.
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5.1 Algorithm Overview
The PrivMin algorithm aims to release the MinHash-based Jaccard similarity between any two cloud
users by the Profile Perturbation approach, which ensures that each user’s private information can
be protected from the passive attack similar to the one in Example 1. That is, based on observation
of the released similarity, potential adversaries cannot re-identify the elements in the original user
profiles. The rationale for PrivMin algorithm is shown in Fig. 3.
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Figure 3: Rationale for PrivMin Algorithm
We examine the minimum hash value computation process within the MinHashing phase, and
add the Exponential noise to the original MinHash signatures through leveraging the Randomized
Response strategy. From the perturbed MinHash signatures, the adversary cannot infer the sensitive
information within the users’ input profiles. Specifically, we conceptualize the PrivMin algorithm
into two private operations:
Private MinHash Value Generation Based on the Exponential mechanism, this operation pri-
vately selects the minimum hash value in each step within the MinHashing phase. By default
this operation will be executed in all the K steps and then the perturbed MinHash signature
will be generated.
Randomized MinHashing Steps Selection In the generation of perturbed MinHash signature,
this operation privately shrinks the number K into m by the Randomized Response technique,
so that the total added Exponential noise is tightly controlled.
Details for the Private MinHash Value Generation is presented in Section 5.2, followed by the
Randomized MinHashing Steps Selection in Section 5.3.
5.2 Private MinHash Value Generation
In this operation, we attempt to add the Exponential noise through the minimum hash value
computation process within the MinHashing phase, and then generate the perturbed MinHash
signatures h˜(K)(SA) and h˜(K)(SB), for the profiles SA and SB. The intuition behind this operation
is that we aim to add just enough noise by leveraging the internal noise in MH-JSC. In this way,
by using the perturbed MinHash signatures, the final similarity would also be a noisy version from
which the semi-honest users cannot successfully launch a passive attack.
More specifically, as proved in Section 4, the MH-JSC satisfies the Conditional -DPSO be-
cause of its internal randomness. Herein, we first show that the MinHashing phase produces such
randomness and it only satisfies the differential privacy in certain situations.
Lemma 1. The MinHashing phase only satisfies the -differential privacy at certain situations in
which the element difference between S and S′ has an impact on the equality of their minimum
hash value.
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Proof. Following the steps described in Section 2.1.1, in the MinHashing phase with K hash
functions, when given neighbour profiles S and S′ which differ only in one element, their hash value
sets for each hash function k are generated and denoted as hk(S) and hk(S
′). Next, the minimum
hash values min{hk(S)} and min{hk(S′)} are selected for further construction of the MinHash
signatures h(K)(S) and h(K)(S
′).
If the value of element that differentiates S from S′ has no impact on the equality of their
minimum hash value under a hash function k, that is, min{hk(S)} = min{hk(S′)}, we have
Pr[min{hk(S)} ∈ O] = Pr[min{hk(S′)} ∈ O]forO ⊆ Range(min{·}),
which satisfies the -differential privacy where  = 0, as shown in Definition 2.
However, if the value of element that differentiates S from S′ does have an impact on the equality
of their minimum hash value under a hash function k, that is, min{hk(S)} 6= min{hk(S′)}, the
MinHashing phase cannot guarantee the -differential privacy in any degree.
Based on the above result, we design the Private MinHash Value Generation algorithm by
adopting the Exponential mechanism to privately select the minimum hash value in the steps
within MinHashing. Specifically, when adopting the Exponential mechanism, the Score Function q
should be carefully defined. Following the suggestions in [15], we use the notation hk(S) ⊕ hk(S′)
to denote the certain set of elements in which hk(S) and hk(S
′) are differ. It is noted that herein
hk(S) and hk(S
′) are not limited to the neighbouring datasets. Then, the Score Function can be
defined as
q(hk(S), ψ) = max
min{hk(S′)}=ψ
−|hk(S)⊕ hk(S′)|, (5)
and the sensitivity of q is 4q = 1.
The following example provides concrete cases showing how to compute the score of the candi-
dates in a given hk(S).
Example 2 Assume hk(S) = {11, 13, 15, 16, 19}, then we have q(hk(S), 10) = q(hk(S), 12) =
q(hk(S), 13) = −1 because changing only one element in hk(S) is enough to make these
minimum values become the true answers of min{hk(S′)}. In the meanwhile, we have
q(hk(S), 16) = −3 because making 16 become the true answer of min{hk(S′)} would require
changing three elements in hk(S).
The details of Private MinHash Value Generation are shown in Algorithm 1. It starts with a user
profile S, the overall privacy budget  and K hash functions. First, the cloud platform initializes a
null vector h˜(K)(S) (Line 1). Then, for the k
th (1 ≤ k ≤ K) hash function hk, the cloud platform
computes the related hash value set hk(S) (line 2-4). Next, to achieve the differential privacy,
the cloud platform selects the minimum hash value min{hk(sn)} with probability proportional to
exp( q(hk(S),ψ)2K4q ), and appends the selected value to Perturbed MinHash Signature h˜(K)(S) (Line 5-8).
The generated Perturbed MinHash Signature can be further used to compute the MinHash-based
Jaccard similarity.
5.3 Randomized MinHashing Steps Selection
Although the above operation relies on the minimum hash value computation process within the
MinHashing phase and makes full use of the internal noise, its utility remains far from acceptable.
This is because when all the steps within the MinHashing phase adopt the Exponential mechanism,
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Algorithm 1 Private MinHash Value Generation
Input: Profile S = {s1, s2, ..., sN}, K hash functions, overall privacy budget .
Output: Perturbed MinHash signature h˜(K)(S).
1: Initialize a null vector h˜(K)(S);
2: for k ← 1...K do
3: for n← 1...N do
4: Compute the hash value hk(sn);
5: end for
6: Construct the hash values set hk(S) = {hk(s1), hk(s2), ..., hk(sN )};
7: Select the minimum hash value min{hk(S)} with probability proportional to exp( q(hk(S),ψ)2K4q );
8: Append to h˜(K)(S);
9: end for
10: return h˜(K)(S)
the cumulative noise would seriously distort the accuracy of outputs. Fortunately, we find that if we
use the Randomized Response technique to select steps for adopting the Exponential mechanism, the
combined algorithm will successfully achieve both in rigorous differential privacy and in acceptable
utility. More specifically, the Randomized MinHashing Steps Selection operation consists of two
main steps which are described as the following.
1. The operation randomly selects several steps out of all the K steps within the MinHashing
phase with probability Pr. For the convenience of recording this result, we maintain an
Original Flip Vector
−→
V in which the binary value in the kth (1 ≤ k ≤ K) place represents
whether the kth step is initially implemented with the Exponential mechanism. As the above
generated vector should be prevented from potential attack and should not be directly used
in the Private MinHash Value Generation operation, a Perturbed Flip Vector
−→
V ′ will be
generated in the next step.
2. Aiming to satisfy the differential privacy in this step, we generate the Perturbed Flip Vector−→
V ′ with Randomized Response technique as described in Section 2.1.3 and similar to the
Permanent Randomized Response proposed in [13]. The Perturbed Flip Vector
−→
V ′ will indicate
which steps within the MinHashing phase will finally be implemented with the Exponential
mechanism. Specifically, given an Original Flip Vector
−→
V , for the value Vk in each bit
k ∈ [0,K] of −→V , this step generates a perturbed binary value V ′k which equals to:
V ′k =

1, with probability 1/2Pt,
0, with probability 1/2Pt,
Vk, with probability 1− Pt,
where Pt is the threshold probability to flip the original binary value. In this way, the
Perturbed Flip Vector
−→
V ′ will be generated. It is noted that we directly set the Pr = Pt in
our experiments as a default setting. An intuition description of this procedure is shown in
Fig 4.
By incorporating the Private MinHash Value Generation with the Randomized MinHashing
Steps Selection, the pseudocode of the PrivMin algorithm is given in Algorithm 2. It starts with
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Figure 4: Generation of Perturbed Flip Vector
a profile S of a user, the overall privacy budget  and K hash functions. Firstly, the cloud
platform initializes a null vector h˜(K)(S) (Line 1) and divides the overall privacy budget  into two
equal parts, 1 and 2 (Line 2-3). The former one is used to calculate the value of the probability
threshold Pt used in Randomized MinHashing Steps Selection while the latter will be assigned to
the Private MinHashing Signature Generation. Secondly, the Perturbed Flip Vector generation
would be triggered as described above (Line 4-5). Thirdly, according to the generated
−→
V ′, the
Exponential mechanism would be deployed on the marked steps within the MinHashing phase
(Line 6-15). And for the steps which are not marked in
−→
V ′, compute their original outputs (Line
16-22). Finally, the computed minimum hash values of each step would be appended to Perturbed
MinHash Signature h˜(K)(S). The generated Perturbed MinHash Signature can be further used to
compute the MinHash-based Jaccard similarity.
6 Algorithm Analysis
The proposed PrivMin algorithm aims to achieve the differential privacy while maintaining an
acceptable utility. In this section, we will prove that the algorithm satisfies -differential privacy
and then provide the utility analysis.
6.1 Privacy Analysis
Based on the Sequential Composition and the Parallel Composition as in Theorem 1 and 2, we
have the following theorem on the privacy guarantee of the proposed algorithm.
Theorem 4. The PrivMin algorithm satisfies -differential privacy.
Proof. Two independent private operations of the PrivMin algorithm can respectively satisfy
relevant level of differential privacy as follows:
- Based on the proofs in [13], since we adopt a similar randomized response approach as the
Permanent Randomized Response in [13], we can conclude that the Randomized MinHashing
Steps Selection operation satisfies 1-differential privacy where 1 = Kln(
Pt
1−Pt ).
- As the Private MinHash Value Generation operation adopts the Exponential mechanism suc-
cessively in the privately selected steps within the MinHashing phase, this operation satisfies
2-differential privacy since the m selected steps respectively achieve
2
m -differential privacy.
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Algorithm 2 PrivMin algorithm
Input: Profile S = {s1, s2, ..., sN}, K hash functions, overall privacy budget .
Output: Perturbed MinHash signature h˜(K)(S).
1: Initialize a row vector h˜(K)(S);
2: 1 ← /2, Pt ← e1/K1+e1/K ;
3: 2 ← /2;
4: Construct the Original Flip Vector
−→
V by randomly choosing its K elements r1, r2, ..., rK from {0, 1}1
with probability Pr;
5: Construct the Perturbed Flip Vector
−→
V ′ by implementing Randomized Response technique described in
Section 5.3;
6: m ← Compute the numbers of the elements in −→V ′ that is equal to 0;
7: ′ ← 2/m;
8: for k ← 1...K do
9: if V ′k = 0 then
10: for n← 1...N do
11: Compute the hash value hk(sn);
12: end for
13: Construct the hash values set hk(S) = {hk(s1), hk(s2), ..., hk(sN )};
14: Select the minimum hash value min{hk(S)} with probability proportional to exp( 
′q(hk(S),ψ)
24q );
15: Append to h˜(K)(S);
16: else
17: for n← 1...N do
18: Compute the hash value hk(sn);
19: end for
20: Construct the hash values set hk(S) = {hk(s1), hk(s2), ..., hk(sN )};
21: Select the minimum value min{hk(S)};
22: Append to h˜(K)(S);
23: end if
24: end for
25: return h˜(K)(S)
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Consequently, according to the Sequential Composition, we can conclude that the PrivMin algo-
rithm satisfies -differential privacy where  = 1 + 2.
6.2 Utility Analysis
Here we adopt (α, δ) − usefulness to measure the Semantic Loss in each step of the Private
MinHash Value Generation operation.
Theorem 5. For all δ > 0, with probability at least 1− δ, the SLoss of the MinHash signatures in
the Private MinHash Value Generation operation is less than α. When
1− 3
2
Pt + P
2
t ≤ δα,
where Pt =
e1/K
1+e1/K
, and the Private MinHash Value Generation operation is satisfied with (α, δ)-
useful.
Proof. According to Markov’s inequality, we have
Pr(SLoss > α) ≤ E(SLoss)
α
(6)
For each minimum hash value min{hk(S)} in h˜(K)(S), the probability of “unchange” in the ran-
domized private selection is proportional to
Pr · (1
2
Pt + 1− Pt) + (1− Pr) · 1
2
Pt = Pr − PrPt + 1
2
Pt
=
3
2
Pt − P 2t .
Therefore, we have
E(SLoss) =
∑
min{hk(S)}∈h(K)(S)
d(min{hk(S)}, m̂in{hk(S)})
max d · |h(K)(S)|
(1− 3
2
Pt + P
2
t ).
According to Eq. (6), the evaluation of the SLoss is
Pr(SLoss > α) ≤
∑
min{hk(S)}∈h(K)(S) d(min{hk(S)}, m̂in{hk(S)})(1− 32Pt + P 2t )
max d · |h(K)(S)|·α
.
When we take the maximal d(min{hk(S)}, m̂in{hk(S)}) = K, it can be simplified as
Pr(SLoss > α) ≥ 1− 1−
3
2Pt + P
2
t
α
. (7)
Let
1− 1−
3
2Pt + P
2
t
α
≥ 1− δ,
thus
1− 3
2
Pt + P
2
t ≤ δα, (8)
where Pt =
e1/K
1+e1/K
.
The proof shows that the Semantic Loss of the Private MinHash Value Generation operation
mainly depends on the privacy budget 1 and the hash function number K.
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7 Experiment and Analysis
In this section, we conduct experiments to examine the performance of the proposed PrivMin
algorithm by answering the following questions:
How does the PrivMin algorithm preserve the utility? The PrivMin algorithm aims to re-
lease Jaccard similarities with acceptable utility. In Section 7.2, we will investigate its per-
formance in terms of F1 Score and Mean Squared Error (MSE) on the released similarities,
and compare it with the Baseline algorithm and MH-JSC.
How will the main parameters impact on the performance of it? The PrivMin algorithm
has two parameters  and K:  controls the privacy level of algorithms; and K determines
the total number of Hash functions which are used in MinHashing phase. In Section 7.2.1
and 7.2.2, we will investigate and analyze their impacts on the involved three algorithms.
7.1 Experiment Setting
7.1.1 Datasets and Configuration
We evaluate the compared algorithms on four real textual datasets:
• Alpine Dale: The Alpine Dale dataset 1 was retrieved from the course website of “text tech-
nologies for data science” by the University of Edinburgh, and includes 10000 news stories for
plagiarism detection. In the following experiments, we will use a subset with 1000 records.
• BBC Sport: This dataset was derived from Insight Project Resources 2. It contains 737
documents from the BBC Sport website corresponding to sports news articles in five topical
areas from 2004− 2005.
• Opinosis [21, 14]: This dataset from Paraphrase Grouped Corpora 3 is a subset of the Opinosis
corpus 4. It contains 669 sentences which were manually grouped according to their meaning.
• MSRP [21, 9]: This dataset from Paraphrase Grouped Corpora is a subset of the the Microsoft
Research Paraphrase corpus 5. It contains 859 sentences which was automatically grouped
according to its original manually annotated meaning.
The involved three algorithms are implemented in Python 2.7 based on the code by Chris
McCormick 6. All the experiments are conducted on an Intel Core i5-3210M 2.50GHz PC with
6GB memory. In each experiment, every algorithm is executed 10 times, and its average score is
reported.
1http://www.inf.ed.ac.uk/teaching/courses/tts/assessed/assessment3.html
2http://mlg.ucd.ie/datasets/bbc.html
3http://white.ucc.asn.au/resources/paraphrase˙grouped˙corpora/
4http://kavita-ganesan.com/opinosis-opinion-dataset
5http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/downloads/607d14d9-20cd-47e3-85bc-a2f65cd28042/
6http://mccormickml.com/2015/06/12/minhash-tutorial-with-python-code/
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7.1.2 Experiment Parameters
We consider two parameters  and K since the performance of algorithms could be affected by
them:
the privacy budget  Although the tradeoff between the privacy budget  and the utility under
the naive Laplace mechanism and the Exponential mechanism is known, we also expect to
discover the situation in which the Randomized Response cooperates with the Exponential
mechanism.
the number of Hash functions K Although it is clear that a smaller number of hash functions
may lead to worse accuracy in similarity, we expect that the PrivMin algorithm to perform
well when K is relatively small.
In our experiments, we will vary above two parameters to study their impacts on the involved
algorithms, in terms to the metrics as mentioned in Section 7.1.3.
7.1.3 Utility Metrics
We adopt the F1 score and Mean Squared Error (MSE) to measure the utility performance among
the proposed PrivMin algorithm, the Baseline algorithm and the MH-JSC.
F1 Score The F1 Score is the harmonic mean of Precision P and Recall R, which can measure
the algorithm outputs’s accuracy compared with the given ground truth. A higher F1 Score
means a better accuracy. Herein, the accurate Jaccard similarity of given two profiles is set
as the ground truth. We aim to investigate the statistical differences between the released
perturbed Jaccard similarity and the accurate one in several tests. The F1 Score can be
calculated as
F1 =
2× P ×R
P +R
, (9)
P =
TP
TP + FP
, (10)
R =
TP
TP + FN
, (11)
where TP is true positive, FP is false positive, TN is true negative, FN is false negative.
Table 3 shows the details of setting for these four variables. According to the specific charac-
teristics of the textual records within four datasets, we empirically set the related thresholds
as 0.5, 0.4, 0.5 and 0.3.
Mean Squared Error (MSE) The Mean Squared Error (MSE) is a measure of the quality of an
estimator by calculating the error between the estimator’s predicted value and its accurate
value. A lower MSE means a better accuracy. The MSE in the following experiments can be
calculated as
MSE =
1
n
n∑
t=1
(predictedt − accuratet)2, (12)
where the predictedt and accuratet are corresponding to the perturbed Jaccard similarity and
accurate Jaccard similarity, respectively. We aim to investigate the numerical errors between the
released perturbed Jaccard similarity and the accurate one in several tests.
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Table 3: Settings of TP, FP, TN and FN
TP
the number of test in which both the perturbed Jaccard similarity
and the accurate Jaccard similarity are above a given threshold.
FP
the number of test in which only the perturbed Jaccard similarity
is above a given threshold and the accurate Jaccard similarity is not.
TN
the number of test in which both the perturbed Jaccard similarity
and the accurate Jaccard similarity are below a given threshold.
FN
the number of test in which only the perturbed Jaccard similarity
is below a given threshold and the accurate Jaccard similarity is not.
7.1.4 Compared Algorithms
We consider a Baseline algorithm and the MH-JSC as the competitors of the PrivMin algorithm.
Baseline The Baseline algorithm is based on the Output Perturbation approach which introduces
differential privacy by directly adding Laplacian noise to the output similarity Jmh(SA, SB)
of MH-JSC:
J˜mh(SA, SB) = Jmh(SA, SB) + Laplace(
∆Jmh

).
The added Lapacian noise is calibrated to the sensitivity of MH-JSC as the following:
∆Jmh = max
SB ,SB′neighbours
‖Jmh(SA, SB)− Jmh(SA, SB′)‖
= max
SB ,SB′neighbours
‖|h(K)(SA) ∩ h(K)(SB)|−|h(K)(SA) ∩ h(K)(SB′)|
K
‖
≤ max
SA,SB
‖|h(K)(SA) ∩ h(K)(SB)|−(|h(K)(SA) ∩ h(K)(SB)|±1)
K
‖
=
1
K
.
Finally, the Baseline algorithm will release the perturbed similarity J˜mh(SA, SB). to the
users UA and UB. Since the Baseline algorithm intuitively adds coarse-grained noise to
achieve differential privacy, we expect that it will underperform the PrivMin algorithm in
most cases.
MH-JSC The MinHash-based Jaccard Similarity Computation (MH-JSC) can be regarded as a
comparative algorithm which maintains an empirical utility upper bound. Since MH-JSC does
not add any external noise, we expected that it will outperform both the PrivMin algorithm
and the Baseline algorithm in most cases, and it’s performance will also be much closer to
that of the PrivMin algorithm.
7.2 The Performance of PrivMin
7.2.1 Impact of Privacy Budget
Firstly, we fix K = 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 and report the utility measures of different algorithms when
varying  from 0.1 to 1.0. Fig. 5 shows the F1 score over four datasets with the change of . We
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observe that the PrivMin algorithm has higher F1 Scores than the Baseline algorithm when given
smaller K and  on all datasets. Specifically in Fig. 5D, when K = 5 and  = 0.2, PrivMin achieves
a F1 Score of 0.3060 while Baseline achieves only 0.0006, with an improvements by 50900%. When
 = 0.5, PrivMin achieves a F1 Score of 0.6881 and outperforms the Baseline by 49050%. The
improvements by PrivMin can also be observed in other subfigures in Fig. 5. For the Baseline
algorithm, the larger , the higher F1 scores. However, we observe that the PrivMin algorithm is
not clearly affected by changing the privacy budget.
For the Mean Squared Error (MSE), Table 4 shows that the PrivMin algorithm generally out-
performs the Baseline algorithm with the changing privacy budget. And in some conditions, it also
maintains a better utility compared with the MH-JSC.
Table 4: Comparison of the MSE on Different Algorithms
Parameters
K 5 15 25
 0.01 0.1 1 0.01 0.1 1 0.01 0.1 1
Alpine Dale
Baseline 801.6931 8.003136 0.080065 88.86992 0.890652 0.008917 32.03135 0.320059 0.003222
PrivMin 0.000055 0.000060 0.000063 0.000024 0.000026 0.000026 0.000016 0.000017 0.000016
MH-JSC 0.000117 0.000031 0.000022
BBC Sport
Baseline 798.8903 8.030287 0.080235 88.95124 0.89008 0.00896 31.94539 0.320657 0.003230
PrivMin 0.000090 0.000088 0.000096 0.000065 0.000060 0.000062 0.000046 0.000044 0.000056
MH-JSC 0.000156 0.000044 0.000023
Opinosis
Baseline 800.8486 7.991925 0.080309 88.57464 0.888713 0.008927 32.03530 0.319903 0.003221
PrivMin 0.000100 0.000099 0.000106 0.000048 0.000053 0.000042 0.000037 0.000035 0.000035
MH-JSC 0.000120 0.000040 0.000025
MSRP
Baseline 798.3747 7.996413 0.080062 89.04559 0.887925 0.008916 31.98979 0.320710 0.003216
PrivMin 0.000135 0.000114 0.000108 0.000099 0.000124 0.000101 0.000084 0.000089 0.000073
MH-JSC 0.000095 0.000031 0.000018
7.2.2 Impact of Hash Function Number
For the F1 Score, we fix  = 0.1, 0.5, 1.0 and vary the size K of a single MinHash signature, to
study its impact on the utility of each algorithm. The results are shown in Fig. 6. As expected, for
the Baseline algorithm its utility measures increase when K increases. We also observe that the
PrivMin algorithm is not clearly affected by the changing K.
For the Mean Squared Error (MSE), Table 4 shows that the PrivMin algorithm generally out-
performs the Baseline algorithm with the changing K. And in some conditions, it also maintains
a better utility compared with the MH-JSC.
7.2.3 Summary and Recommendations
Remarkably, although the Baseline algorithm can achieve -differential privacy by adopting the
Laplace mechanism, it can hardly maintain an acceptable F1 Score unless both  and K are large
(e.g.,  ≥ 1.0 and K ≥ 20, or  ≥ 0.8 and K ≥ 25 in experimental results shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 5).
This is because that in the design of the Baseline algorithm, the MH-JSC is directly considered as a
“black box”, and the noise adding is applied on this box’s output without exploiting the minimum
hash value computation process inside the box. In contrast, the intuition behind the PrivMin
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Figure 5: Varying : F1
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algorithm is that introducing the Exponential noise to the minimum hash value computation process
of MinHashing phase in a privately randomized way, which helps the proposed algorithm achieve
both -differential privacy and acceptable utility. Based on the above empirical results in terms
of utility metrics, when using the proposed PrivMin algorithm, we recommend that  ≤ 1.0 and
K ≤ 20 or,  ≤ 0.8 and K ≤ 25.
8 Conclusions
Jaccard Similarity Computation is an essential process which has been widely used in many real-
world applications such as recommendation and plagiarism detection. However, its potential privacy
leakage is an emerging issue that needs to be addressed. Current research pay little attention on
the MinHash-based Jaccard Similariy Computation (MH-JSC) for designing a differentially private
algorithm. This paper studies the MH-JSC under the relaxed and the strict differential privacy with
the following contributions:
• We first provide a relaxed definition of −DPSO that extends the differential privacy into
set operations. It is found that the MH-JSC satisfies the Conditional  − DPSO naturally.
Relevant theorem and detailed proof of privacy analysis are provided in Section 4.
• Based on the above analysis, we then proposed the PrivMin algorithm in Section 5 to achieve
the differential privacy. The proposed algorithm consists of two private operations, the Private
MinHashing Value Generation that applies the naive Exponential mechanism for the Min-
Hashing phase, and the Randomized MinHashing Steps Selection which takes the advantages
of the Randomized Response technique.
These contributions constitute a practical solution to the differentially private Jaccard similarity
computation with less utility loss. Our theoretical and experimental analysis in Section 6 and 7
show that the proposed PrivMin algorithm could reserve acceptable utility.
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